The significance of the most important legal act-the Constitution-to the social medium is evident. This constituent act of the nation determines the legal, political, moral and social life of the social medium. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the Constitution-the content of this constituent act-is the object of everybody's attention. The Constitution is interpreted by lawyers, public leaders, state institutions, scholars and individual persons. The article analyses the wide-ranging subjects interpreting the Constitution and presents the types of its interpreters. The three most prominent groups of such subjects can be distinguished as: (i) institutions of constitutional justice, (ii) the scholarly doctrine, and (iii) other subjects. The article discusses the legal, scientific and social value of interpretations of the Constitution formulated by these interpreters. It is held that the most meaningful thing in this typology is distinguishing the interpretations according to the factor of their legal effects. The differing scientific, legal and social value of the interpretations does not deny the factor of the significance of their existence. It is recognised that a large number of interpretations of the content of the Constitution come from an 
INTRODUCTION
As early as the beginning of the twentieth century Carl Schmitt recognised that the term constitution could be perceived in a number of fairly different ways.
He wrote: "[t]he term 'constitution' has various senses. In general meaning of the word, everything, each man and thing, every business and association, is somehow included in a 'constitution', and everything conceivable can have a constitution." 2 However, Thomas Paine's idea that a constitution is the property of a nation, and not of those who exercise the government, coming from The Rights of Man and published in eighteenth century, is nothing short of classic. The question is, however, whether a nation, being the owner of the constitution, is indeed its ultimate interpreter?
The loneliness of the constitution in the legal system stems from its unparalleled power and thus poses serious challenges to its interpreters. At the same time the power and importance of the constitution to the legal system encourages individual efforts aimed at finding out 'what is what' in the constitution.
Quite often, however, interpreters fail to give due regard to the fact that complexity of interpretation is preconditioned by the complexity of the constitution itself. Given the supreme legal character of the constitution and its role as the most important catalogue of human rights it seems that the constitution should encourage and welcome such interpretations. The question is, however, which interpretation should be chosen from the vast number of possible options and which interpretation should be considered as the foothold when defending personal rights?
Consequently, one should not be surprised when the concerned entities demonstrate a predilection for considering their own interpretation, which usually and unsurprisingly speaks in their favour, to be the ultimate one. It is also obvious that interpreters of the constitution are fairly different in terms of their intellectual 1 abilities, social standing and other aspects, which also impacts the outcomes of interpretation. Alongside the 'free' interpreters, constrained only by their mental ability, there is a range of governmental and other institutions, which, as a part of their remit, must interpret law while ensuring legality and applying legal norms.
Every time one comes across challenges with interpretation of the constitution or its norms it becomes clear that J.L. Bergel was right when he wrote that an act of law is not only an act produced by lawmakers, but also an act of interpreters of law, judges and other participants of the legal process. 3 Given that each and every one of us is very different, it is not surprising that we all have 'our own' constitution. It is for this reason that legal writings provide a large number of typologies which seek to combine interpreters of the constitution into groups. Each such typology is heavily influenced by the methodology and objectives chosen by its author and every such methodology is meaningful in its own special way.
In his Pure Theory of Law Hans Kelsen distinguishes several interpreters: "we have two kinds of interpretations which must be clearly distinguished:
interpretation of law by the applying organ, and the interpretation of the law by a private individual and especially by the science of law." 4 This typology, however, ignores the issue of the legal significance of interpretations. Such methodology would not help to parse the difference of the value of interpretations provided by, for instance, the US Supreme Court in its jurisprudence, a legal writer such as R.
Dworkin, or thoughts shared during a press conference by the president of USA.
Maybe they are all equally valuable? J. Pelikan, in contrast to Kelsen, is more exhaustive as he refers to as many as four groups of interpreters: a) people b) legal doctrine, c) legal practitioners, d) governmental institutions. 5 Even though this typology seeks to cover all of the possible interpreters, it fails to address the issue of the legal value of interpretations. Therefore, this typology does not address the issue of legal consequences caused by different interpretations.
One of the Italian sources on constitutional law identifies four groups of interpreters: an interpreter who passed the relevant norm (interpretazione autentica), an official interpreter (interpretazione ufficiale), law enforcement institutions (interpretazione giudiziale) and legal doctrine (interpretazione dottrinale). 6 This 'Italian' typology differs from the ones mentioned before in that an institution that has passed the relevant norm is also regarded as one of the possible interpreters. Such classification has a legal logic. It is fair to say that the institution that has the power to pass a legal norm may also provide guidelines on 7 When speaking of the obligation of the constitutional court to ensure the constitutionality of a legal act, the said constitution, however, grants the court the right not only to interpret the constitution, but also to interpret legal acts adopted by the parliament. Similar powers are vested in constitutions of other nations as well. Parliaments are indeed law-making institutions, but the constitutionality of laws passed by them may still be checked. In the course of the process that follows, the institutions of constitutional justice will not only interpret the meaning of the constitution, but also the meaning of laws under review. It is also noteworthy that even constitutional amendments are interpreted by institutions of constitutional review rather than the parliaments that adopted them.
Additionally, it is not unusual to classify interpreters of the constitution based 
INTERPRETERS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Analysis of typologies of interpreters of the constitution introduced in the scientific environment sometimes brings about fairly controversial results. For example, highly regarded political scientist R. J. Spitzer divides interpreters of the constitution by professions and thus seeks to prove that interpretation of the constitution by lawyers is of questionable value. 8 Why do lawyers fail to please political scientist R. J. Spitzer? This is because while interpreting constitutions they do not seek objectivity, and because in its essence the legal profession promotes Evidently, "only a functional constitution is meaningful, i.e. the one which is followed by citizens, officials and state institutions when carrying out their activity." 11 Thus, when summarising the mentioned typologies of interpreters of the constitution we may note that anyone who seeks to interpret the constitution must be able to differentiate interpretations based on how compulsory they are.
Therefore any typology which reveals the difference between a) official and b) non official interpreters makes sense, because such a typology draws a clear line between those interpretations which legally determine the functionality of the system of legal norms and those which are nothing more than essays on the meaning of the constitution. norms, only the mandatory interpretation of the constitution can be important. It is this interpretation which results in a legal reality rather than remaining merely the result of individual efforts. Therefore it could be maintained that any typology identifying official and unofficial interpreters is meaningful, for it reveals which interpretation will result in actual legal consequences and which is merely the expression of freedom of speech and thought. We must also admit, however, that the dichotomous typology which only takes account of the factor of mandatoriness into account could further be developed so as to incorporate features observed in the abundance of official and unofficial interpretations. The typology presented in Table 1 not only takes account of the mandatory (or non-mandatory) character of the interpretation, but also places an emphasis on the importance of legal research. This typology is relevant for several reasons. By putting separately the institutions of constitutional justice we are able to avoid meaningless and subjective discussions on the degree of 'science' in their interpretation. 12 An official conception of the constitution formulated by institutions of constitutional justice is mandatory to everyone and the official interpretation is a source of legality for the whole system of legal norms.
Sitting next to the official constitutional jurisprudence, the scholarly doctrine occupies an exceptional position in the typology of interpreters of the constitution.
It is the scholarly interpreters who, by drawing on the freedom of research and Seeks to influence the official conception of the Constitution.
Arguments of a scientific character.
Seeks to influence the official conception of the Constitution. obiter dicta or ratio decidendi of some court decisions but also for tendencies in the development of law. 15 However, choosing the easiest way, relying on respected scholars rather than seeking a logical system of arguments, is a typical course of action in other areas as well. It is particularly so in the case of common sense type of arguments and individual interpretations of the constitution.
COMMON SENSE IS NOT SO COMMON
The common sense type of argument(s) is a specific system of argumentation. In Table 3 we referred to other interpreters and also pointed out that the quality of interpretation provided by these interpreters reflects the limitations of common sense. example from criminality. Based on the fact that crime is a disgusting and despicable phenomenon, common sense erroneously decides that it should become extinct altogether. 16 Meanwhile the science of criminology draws a completely opposite conclusion, maintaining that criminality will not leave any country untouched, including Luxembourg with a $ 100.000 rate per capita. Thomas Kuhn notes something more, writing that in the partially circular arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent. 17 The author makes a very good point about the fact that rarely will a man be able to critically inquire into interpretations that express his own intentions. Artificiality is 16 Common sense arguments are also insidious because they are difficult to tell from the scholarly ones when they withstand the test of logical consistency.
However, they cannot be treated as scholarly arguments, which are different. While aiming to be regarded as an expert's voice on certain issues, not only scholarly arguments follow clear logical reasoning and have an empirical basis (which is very typical of common sense arguments) but are founded on a systemic analysis of a constitutional issue at stake. The illusion of simplicity within the social sciences brings the idea that participation in a constitutional discourse nearly does not require any special preparation. It is in this type of discourse that "we can quite often notice attempts to juxtapose the concepts of constitution and democracy, the rule of law on the basis of subjectively perceived slogans of 'democracy' or 'real national (or public) interest." 19 It is obvious that such views are dominated by common sense arguments. for objectivity. Quite often their objectives are permeated by subjective or political interest or personal motivation. However, politics is an important business, which has its own objectives and modus operandi, and it is not unnatural that even the 'efforts' of politicians should be respected. The conclusions drawn by institutions of constitutional justice and the scholarly doctrine are different from common sense approach in that they follow a logical system, therefore even when one does not agree with them, it is not easy to prove otherwise.
The quality of interpretation depends on how well the interpreter is acquainted with the problem of constitutional justice at the systemic level.
However, no one could say with absolute certainty that common sense arguments and conclusions that follow will always contradict the scholarly doctrine or the ones formulated by the official interpreter. However, even when these coincide, scholarly conclusions are more valuable as they rest on stronger qualitative and quantitative arguments. On the other hand, it must also be observed that even though scholarly doctrine is more 'professional' and able to elegantly defeat common sense arguments it is unable to come up with a unified conclusion. It is so because of the scholarly pluralism and the resulting considerable fragmentation. Because of this, not only the public at large but also revered scholars sometimes see the constitution as an interpretative enigma. It is obvious that the 'enigmatic' nature of constitutional interpretation lies in the fact that from a scholarly perspective all interpretations are equal in that they do not result in any actual legal consequences. The destiny and significance of these subjective interpretations are at the 'mercy' of the official interpreter. It is the will of the official interpreter that gives the 'interpretational enigma' its jurisprudential form and makes it the source of actual legal consequences. In this respect J. M. Pollock is quite right to note that justices are the final arbiters and interpreters of law. 20 It is so, because the interpretation formulated by the court or by an institution of constitutional justice (to be more precise) is obligatory to everybody as a source of law.
CYCLE OF INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
"We have a constitutional text", but "we do not disagree about which inscriptions comprise that text." 21 R. Alexy recognised the fact that "everyone who can speak may take part in discourse" and "everyone may problematize any assertion", "everyone may introduce any assertion into the discourse, "everyone 20 Thus, the interpretation of the constitution is not (probably not only) the condition of its application (so, it is not "supplement" to the constitutional document), but a process, which guarantees harmony between the stability of fundamental constitutional provisions in the continuous development of the ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2 2012
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constitutional regulation and dynamics of the constitution, understood as its capability to correspond to the changing social and political environment.
24
All of the composite parts of the cycle of interpretation of the constitution make it possible for the principle of the rule of law to exist in a democratic society, because "we might borrow from the constitutional text to help remind us of our past political struggles or inspire us to take on new national projects".
25

CONCLUSIONS
The official interpreter of the constitution is an institution, which has authorities of a constitutional character, and no other. The constitution sets the right and the duty to the constitutional justice institution to interpret constitution, i.e. to formulate constitutional jurisprudence (official version of the concept of constitution).
Constitutional jurisprudence being formulated by the constitutional justice institution is the only source that is the basis to guarantee the legitimacy of legal norms in the system. Official interpretation is obligatory, i.e. it is not dispositive, and, on the contrary, it is an imperative form of law. It must be accepted and followed by every subject of legal relations.
Providences of scholarly doctrine, unlike official constitutional jurisprudence having no juridical obligation guarantees, can only make influence on official interpreter with validity of scientific arguments and hope for it to become an official one someday. Subjectivity of scholarly doctrine and its dispositive character does not negate its significance in the legal norms constitutionality insurance process. The cycle of interpretation of the constitution is an immanent system of the constitution's content perception that already exists in the society: from the superficiality of common sense to scientific arguments and systematic cognition of the problem and, finally, from the scientific to official constitutional jurisprudence.
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